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Part II
User-Generated Content Sites and
Section 512 of the US Copyright Act
Jane C. Ginsburg*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the evolution of digital communications, the means of reproducing and
disseminating copyrighted works increasingly leave the control of copyright
owners and commercial distribution intermediaries. Websites and peer-to-
peer and other technologies allow members of the public to originate the
public communication of works of authorship. This does not mean that dis-
semination intermediaries have vanished from the copyright landscape, but
rather that we have new kinds of intermediaries who do not themselves
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distribute copyrighted content but give their customers the means to make
works available to the public.
When the works thus offered are neither of the distributor’s own creation,
nor distributed with the creator’s permission, the person making the works
available is a copyright infringer – assuming no exception, such as fair use,
applies.1 But the principal economic actor in this scenario is not likely to be
the member of the public effecting the distribution. Rather, it is the entrepre-
neur who intentionally facilitated the distribution, for example, by operating a
website to which members of the public could post the works, by targeting
search services to locations where the works can be found, or by distributing
file-sharing software designed to enable unauthorized copying and commu-
nication of works. Meaningful copyright enforcement will seek to establish
the liability of the entrepreneurs.2
But all the technologies just evoked are ‘dual purpose’. That is, they are
not inherently pernicious; on the contrary, they can in fact be, and often are,
put to perfectly lawful and socially desirable uses. If the technology itself is at
least in theory neutral, does this pose an insoluble quandary: either enforce
copyright at the expense of technological evolution, or promote technology at
the cost of copyright? Or does the question so framed enmesh us in a false
1. Disseminating or offering works online for end-user access via streaming or downloading
comes within the author’s exclusive right of ‘making available’, set out at Art. 8 of the
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, 20 Dec. 1996, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-17, which defines the right in terms similar to the US right of public performance
by transmission, but is not limited to performances of works. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Although the US’s membership in this treaty requires implementation of the ‘making
available’ right, the exclusive rights listed in the US Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (2000), do not explicitly include a ‘making available’ right. While a streaming digital
delivery is a public performance, a file transfer consisting of a download that does not also
render a performance, may not be. See United States v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443–
444 (SDNY 2007). The § 106(3) distribution right covers those digital deliveries, see id.
and authorities cited therein, but it is less clear whether offering a file for download, without
a concomitant delivery to another’s digital receiving device, also comes within § 106(3).
See generally, D.O. Carson, ‘Making the Making Available Right Available’, Columbia
Journal of Law and the Arts 33 (2010): 135 (discussing statute and cases); J.C. Ginsburg,
‘Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?’, Revue
Internationale du Droit d’Auteur 218 (October 2008): 167 and 239 (discussing cases).
2. As Judge Posner bluntly stated in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation: ‘The [digital file]
swappers, who are ignorant or more commonly disdainful of copyright and in any event
discount the likelihood of being sued or prosecuted for copyright infringement, are the
direct infringers. But firms that facilitate their infringement, even if they are not themselves
infringers because they are not making copies of the music that is shared, may be liable to
the copyright owners as contributory infringers. Recognizing the impracticability or futility
of a copyright owner’s suing a multitude of individual infringers (‘‘chasing individual
consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem,’’), the law
allows a copyright holder to sue a contributor to the infringement instead, in effect as an
aider and abettor.’ 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
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dichotomy? The legal rules should enable us to have it both ways, fostering
both authorship and technological innovation, by ensuring the ‘neutrality’ of
the technology as applied in a given business setting. ‘Neutrality’, however, is
not the same thing as non-intervention. An entrepreneur who adopts what I’ll
call a passive-aggressive approach to user conduct that the entrepreneur rea-
sonably should anticipate (and indeed may intend) will collectively be infring-
ing on a large scale may in fact be building its business at the expense of
authors and right owners. In that event, it should not matter how anodyne in
the abstract the technology may be; by failing to take steps to forestall ‘mas-
sive’ infringement, the entrepreneur may in fact be encouraging unlawful user
conduct, and may thereby be exposing itself to liability, at least under
common law principles of secondary liability.3
The recent District Court decision in Viacom v. YouTube, however, indi-
cates that the statutory safe harbour established by section 512 of the US
copyright act may shield the entrepreneur who anticipates – and even ‘wel-
come(s)’ – infringements so long as the entrepreneur lacks ‘actual or con-
structive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individual
items’.4 While the statute makes clear that the entrepreneur should not be
pressed into service as the investigative arm of the copyright owner,5 the
Viacom decision does not simply decline to impose an obligation to seek out
the infringers who may lurk within the user base. Rather, the decision argu-
ably rejects neutrality to read into the statute a high degree of solicitude not
only for online entrepreneurs whose businesses occasionally may accommo-
date infringing users, but also for those who effectively solicit infringers. If,
by contrast the neutrality principle does animate the statute, a court could
appropriately apply that principle through a duty to take reasonable precau-
tions to avoid apparent and repeat infringements.
This article considers the liability of entrepreneurs of ‘user-generated
content’ (UGC) sites. These immensely popular fora, such as YouTube and
My Space, enable their participants to post and view a great variety of content,
not all of it in fact generated by the posting user. (It might be more accurate to
label these sites as ‘User-posted content’ sites.) The legislative compromise
worked out between telecommunications providers and content owners in the
1998 ‘Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ provides the statutory framework
for determining the extent to which the liability limitations enacted into
section 512 of the Copyright Act can be interpreted to realize the neutrality
objective, at once insulating the operators of UGC sites from debilitating
copyright sanctions, while still affording meaningful relief to copyright
owners.
3. See MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
4. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62829 at *14 and *15–*16 (SDNY 2010).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2000).
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II. THE STATUTORY NOTICE-AND-TAKE-DOWN
SAFE HARBOUR
In section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,6 Internet Service
Providers (telecoms) obtained a large measure of impunity: if the service
provider meets the threshold requirements, it will incur no liability (direct
or derivative) for monetary damages if it responds expeditiously to a proper
notice from the copyright holder, and blocks access to the offending material.7
The statutory criteria are designed to ensure that the beneficiaries of the
section 512(c) safe harbour remain copyright-neutral. Courts interpreting
section 512(c) have recognized the neutrality prerequisite:
This immunity, however, is not presumptive, but granted only to ‘innocent’
service providers who can prove they do not have actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringement, as defined under any of the three [thresh-
old requirements] of 17 U.S.C. Section 512(c)(1). The DMCA’s protec-
tion of an innocent service provider disappears at the moment the service
provider loses its innocence, i.e., at the moment it becomes aware that a
third party is using its system to infringe.8
Under section 512, the qualifying ‘innocent’ service provider incurs no
general burden of anticipating or preventing infringement;9 it need only react
to notices of infringement that the copyright holders uncover. But because one
may anticipate that at least some of the content the notified service provider
takes down will promptly reappear, hydra-like, the question arises at what
point, if any, the service provider becomes disqualifyingly ‘aware’ that the
contested content is making repeat appearances, so that some obligation to
forestall specific infringements may arise.
6. Id., § 512(c).
7. See § 512(c).
8. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
9. Id., § 512(m)(1) (stating that availability of the safe harbour is not conditioned on ‘a service
provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activ-
ity’). Section 512(i)(1)(B) does make ‘accommodat[ion of] . . . standard technical mea-
sures’ a prerequisite to qualifying for the statutory safe harbours. Arguably, filtering
technology might be such a measure. The definition of ‘standard technical measures’,
however, suggests that the present state of filtering technologies may not suffice, princi-
pally because there is not yet an inter-industry consensus regarding the design and imple-
mentation of filtering measures. See § 512(i)(2). Section 512(i)(2) states:
(2) Definition – As used in this subsection, the term ‘standard technical measures’
means technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copy-
righted works and –
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and
service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process;
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on




The following discussion will analyse the specific statutory prerequisites
to qualifying for a limitation on liability. To aid in that discussion, consider a
hypothetical website, culture-for-me.com. It offers its users the opportunity to
post video clips to its website. Culture-for-me.com neither promotes infringe-
ment, nor filters infringements out; its business plan aspires to a high volume
of traffic to the site. In its early days, the website attracted amateur videos, but
more recently users have also been posting copies of commercial film and
television programming. Culture-for-me.com’s popularity has risen substan-
tially since professionally-produced (unauthorized) content began to be found
on the site; the traffic to the unauthorized user postings is very heavy; indeed,
those postings generally (but not always) receive more ‘hits’ than the amateur
content.
A. ‘SERVICE PROVIDER’
Culture-for-me.com operates a website; is it therefore a ‘service provider’
within the ambit of the statutory immunity? Section 512s definition of ‘service
provider’ is exceedingly vague; the term ‘means a provider of online services
or network access or the operator of facilities therefore’.10 ‘Online services’
are not defined. In the abstract, the term could mean any services offered
online, including the service of making copyrighted works available to the
public. Or the term could mean services specific to being online (other than
network access, for which the definition specifically provides). Under the first
interpretation, anyone who operates a website is a ‘service provider’. Under the
second, an entrepreneur who hosts a website is a ‘service provider’, as is one who
provides online search services; the entrepreneur who makes content available,
however, would not be a ‘service provider’ because the services provided are not
Internet-specific. One can provide content from a variety of platforms (e.g., print,
broadcast), but one can host or link to a website only via the Internet.11
The case law nonetheless has generally interpreted ‘service provider’
extremely broadly, to cover not only Internet-specific businesses, but a variety
of traditional businesses’ Internet operations, such as online auctions,12
10. § 512(k)(1)(B).
11. Section 512(i)(1)(A), which requires qualifying service providers to implement a policy
for terminating the accounts of repeat infringers, may not cover operators of websites to
which users post content if the users do not need to subscribe to or have an account with
the website in order to post material to it. This could suggest that such websites do not
qualify for the statutory safe harbour. On the other hand, making ability to terminate the
accounts of repeat infringers a prerequisite to any ‘service provider’s’ ability to qualify for
a safe harbour might clash with the § 512(d) safe harbour for search engines, because
most, if not all users of search engines access the service without becoming subscribers or
account holders of the service.
12. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (but parties did not
dispute whether eBay was a ‘service provider’ within the meaning of the statute).
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online real estate listings,13 and an online pornography age verification
service.14
The statute’s legislative history indicates that a ‘service provider’ was not
intended to embrace every kind of business found on the Internet. The exam-
ples of service providers given in the House Report consist entirely of enter-
prises who provide ‘space’ for third-party websites and fora, not the operators
of the websites themselves.15 This makes sense in the context of Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,16 the
case law that section 512(c) substantially codified.17 In Netcom, the service
provider defendant was an Internet access provider that hosted third-party
newsgroups, to which another defendant had posted documents without the
authorization of the Church of Scientology. Nonetheless, even if Congress
may not have had website operators in mind (much less the emerging
Web 2.0 businesses), the language it chose to define ‘service providers’ is
broad enough to encompass more Internet entities than Congress specifically
contemplated in 1998.
B. ‘STORAGE AT THE DIRECTION OF A USER’
Assuming, then, that a website operator can be a service provider within the
meaning of section 512, which of its activities does the statute immunize, and
subject to what conditions? Section 512(c) absolves a service provider from
liability ‘for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated
by or for the service provider . . .’.18 Is a website, as opposed to a server which
hosts websites, ‘a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
service provider’? If not, the provision would not apply. But a website might
be part of a system operated by the service provider, so this element does not
screen out many actors. More importantly, section 512 exculpates ‘storage at
13. Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 701 (D. Md. 2001) (‘‘‘Online
services’’ is surely broad enough to encompass the type of service provided by LoopNet
that is at issue here.’).
14. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(assuming defendant qualified as a service provider, but admitting that it ‘has found no
discussion [in prior case law] of this definition’s limits’).
15. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 64 (1998) (‘This definition includes, for example, services
such as providing Internet access, e-mail, chat room and web page hosting services.’); see
also ibid., at 53 (describing services covered by § 512(c): ‘Examples of such storage
include providing server space for a user’s web site, for a chatroom, or other forum in
which material may be posted at the direction of users’).
16. 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
17. See, for example, David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (San Francisco: Matthew
Bender, 2009)§ 12B.06[B][2][a] (2006) (s. 512 essentially codifies Netcom).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2000).
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the direction of a user’;19 it does not suspend liability for other acts in which
the service provider might engage with respect to the user-posted content.20
Additional unrelated acts may fall outside the scope of mere ‘storage’. The
Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 v. CCBill came to a similar conclusion regarding
section 512(d)’s safe harbour for search engines:
Even if the hyperlink provided by CCBill could be viewed as an ‘infor-
mation location tool’, the majority of CCBill’s functions would remain
outside of the safe harbor of Section 512(d). Section 512(d) provides
safe harbor only for ‘infringement of copyright by reason of the provider
referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing
material or infringing activity’. (Emphasis added). Perfect 10 does not
claim that CCBill infringed its copyrights by providing a hyperlink;
rather, Perfect 10 alleges infringement through CCBill’s performance
of other business services for these websites. Even if CCBill’s provision
of a hyperlink is immune under § 512(n), CCBill does not receive blanket
immunity for its other services.21
More recently, however, federal district courts ruled that section 512(c) does
not require the host service provider to restrict its activities to the mere storage
of user-posted content.22 As one of the district courts stressed, section
512 assumes that users will be able to access content posted to host websites;
thus, the websites must be permitted to transmit the stored content to the
requesting user. The court did not address whether a storage-plus activity that
is not ‘closely related to, and follows from, the storage itself’ would disqualify
the host from the section 512(c) safe harbour.23 The district court in Viacom v.
YouTube agreed that:
To the extent defendants’ activities go beyond what can fairly be char-
acterized as meeting the above-described collateral scope of ‘storage’
and allied functions, and present the elements of infringements under
existing principles of copyright law, they are not facially protected by
§ 512(c). Such activities simply fall beyond the bounds of the safe harbor
and liability for conducting them must be judged according to the general
law of copyright infringement.24
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Cf. Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001) (‘The legis-
lative history indicates that [the actions protected by § 512(c) do] not include [the action
of uploading] material ‘‘that resides on the system or network operated by or for the
service provider through its own acts or decisions and not at the direction of a user’’.’
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 53 (1998)).
21. 481 F.3d 751, 766 (9th Cir. 2007).
22. SeeUMG v. Veoh, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104980; 89 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1449 (C.D. Cal.
2008); Io v. Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
23. See UMG v. Veoh, above, at *31.
24. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62829 at *40.
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Nonetheless, the court continued, YouTube would lose the safe harbour only
with respect to the activities that exceeded the bounds of ‘‘‘storage’’ and allied
functions’; any excess would not disqualify those activities that came within
those bounds.
To return to culture-for-me.com, let us assume it is not contributing
substantial value-added to the user-posted content, so that its liability would
be based simply on its provision of a site from which users may upload and
others may download content. This conduct comes squarely within the zone of
the statutory exception. But the exception will not apply unless the entrepre-
neur meets the statutory conditions. A review of these conditions shows their
common law ancestry: the criteria are very close to the elements of contrib-
utory and vicarious liability.25
C. STATUTORY CONDITIONS FOR LIMITATION ON LIABILITY:
KNOWLEDGE OR AWARENESS
First, while the service provider has no obligation to monitor the site,26 it must
neither have actual knowledge that the postings are infringing,27 nor be ‘aware
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent’.28 Once
the service provider becomes aware of apparent infringements, it must ‘act[]
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material’.29 Such awareness
triggers a proactive obligation to block access in order to qualify for the stat-
utory immunity. What constitutes ‘apparent’ infringing activity, then, is key to
determining whether the safe harbour applies.
The case law interpreting the statutory ‘red flag’30 standard suggests the
flag may need to be an immense crimson banner before the service provider’s
obligation to intervene comes into play:
Although efforts to pin down exactly what amounts to knowledge of
blatant copyright infringement may be difficult, it requires, at a minimum,
that a service provider who receives notice of a copyright violation be
25. See, for example, P. Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright, 3rd edn (New York: Aspen
Publishers, 2009) (Looseleaf), 2, § 8.3.2 (‘The first of the three concurrent conditions for
the safe harbor is patterned after the knowledge requirement for contributory
infringement. . . . The second condition for this safe harbor effectively embodies the rules
on vicarious liability. . . . ’).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2000). Section 512(m) states that ‘[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on (1) a service
provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activ-
ity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the




30. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, 763 (9th Cir. 2007).
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able to tell merely from looking at the user’s activities, statements, or
conduct that copyright infringement is occurring.31
Examples of conduct sufficiently blatant to warrant the service provider’s
vigilance might include abnormally and disproportionately high traffic to
the area of the site where the alleged infringement is located, or the appear-
ance of terms like ‘pirated’ or ‘bootleg’ in the name of the file.32 But the
context of the website might blur the meaning even of file names like ‘stolen’.
In Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that the titles of
pornographic websites that defendant hosted, ‘illegal.net’ and ‘stolencelebri-
typics.com’, should have alerted the defendant host server to the copyright-
infringing nature of the websites’ content.33 The court observed:
When a website traffics in pictures that are titillating by nature, describ-
ing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their
salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actu-
ally illegal or stolen. We do not place the burden of determining whether
photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.34
Similarly, the district court in Viacom v. YouTube stressed that ‘General
knowledge that infringement is ‘‘ubiquitous’’ does not impose a duty on the
service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements’:35
the phrases ‘actual knowledge that the material or an activity’ is infring-
ing, and ‘facts or circumstances’ indicating infringing activity, describe
knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of particular
individual items. Mere knowledge of prevalence of such activity in
general is not enough. That is consistent with an area of the law devoted
to protection of distinctive individual works, not of libraries. To let
knowledge of a generalized practice of infringement in the industry, or
of a proclivity of users to post infringing materials, impose responsibility
on service providers to discover which of their users’ postings infringe a
copyright would contravene the structure and operation of the DMCA.36
31. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1104–1105 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
32. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (offering large volume of audio or audiovisual files); In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (chat groups offering instructions on how to
engage in illegal downloading); Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (citing Hendrickson v.
eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001)) (suspicious file names); cf. Screen Gems-
Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(noting that suspiciously low price of records might have made it obvious to defendant
that they were pirated).
33. CCBill, 481 F.3d at 763.
34. Ibid.
35. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62829 at *35.
36. Id., at *29–*30.
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On the other hand, one might contend that if the file title includes the name of
a motion picture, television programme, or sound recording of which the
person or entity posting the content is obviously not the copyright owner,
this may be sufficiently specific to raise a red flag.37 Of course, not every
file name’s incorporation of a film’s title inevitably means the file infringes.
Some files may in fact be parodies of, or other kinds of pastiche or commen-
tary on, the copyrighted work, and therefore could well be fair use. The
question is whether the presence of the title under circumstances in which
it would be obvious that the rightholder did not authorize the posting should
trigger a pro-active obligation on the part of the service provider to take a
look. Any such obligation might be reinforced if the titles were the subject of
repeated section 512(c) ‘take down’ notices sent by the rights holders. In those
circumstances, the film’s title might make infringement ‘apparent’, and min-
imal investigation on the service provider’s part could indicate whether in a
particular case, appearances deceive.38
But the Viacom court applied a much more bright-line approach to the ‘red
flag’ standard: if the posting on its face does not clearly reveal infringement, then
37. Cf. Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (‘Without some evidence from the site raising a red
flag, Amazon would not know enough about the photograph, the copyright owner, or the
user to make a determination that the vendor was engaging in blatant copyright
infringement.’).
38. Repeated take down notices are likely to result from an automated search of the website
(or of the Internet as a whole): the search ‘bot’ identifies a file bearing or including the
name of the copyrighted work, and automatically generates a take-down notice sent
to the host service provider. See generally Public Knowledge, ‘Transcript of Verizon-
RIAA Subpoena Discussion at National Press Club’, <www.publicknowledge.org/?node/
730>, 20 Mar. 2008. Mechanisms of this sort may reduce some of the enforcement costs
that the § 512(c) regime imposes on copyright owners, although it is not clear that
individual authors and small independent producers have the means to avail themselves
of these automated resources. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000). The clearance burden that
§ 512 displaces to copyright owners thus would fall disproportionately on those least
equipped to assume the greater enforcement costs. See id. § 512. Automated take-down
notices, however, may be problematic if they are triggered by nothing more than a file
name correlation, for some notices may demand removal of postings which could be fair
uses; such notices might subject the sender to liability under § 512(f) for ‘knowingly
materially misrepresents under this section (1) that the material or activity is infringing’.
See Lenz v. Universal Music Group, 572 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
In addition, if the film’s title correlates to the subscriber information or IP address of
an uploader who previously posted infringing files, the combination of claimed content
and suspect source should deepen the red flag’s hue. Section 512(i) requires that service
provider adopt and implement a policy for terminating subscribers who are ‘repeat infrin-
gers’, but it does not so far appear that the prospect of cutting users’ access to the websites
to which they post infringing content offers a meaningful remedy, perhaps because ter-
minated subscribers can re-subscribe under other names or identifying information, and/
or because the statutory standard is unclear: for example, must the repeat infringements
have been adjudicated? See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, ‘The Promise of Internet
Intermediary Liability’, William & Mary Law Review 47 (2005): 239, 301 (raising these
points with respect to an analogous provision in § 512(a) regarding access providers).
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infringing activity is not sufficiently ‘apparent’; no further investigation should
be required.
‘. . . if investigation of ‘‘facts and circumstances’’ is required to identify
material as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are not ‘‘red
flags’’ ’. That observation captures the reason why awareness of perva-
sive copyright-infringing, however flagrant and blatant, does not impose
liability on the service provider. It furnishes at most a statistical estimate
of the chance any particular posting is infringing – and that is not a ‘red
flag’ marking any particular work.39
Viacom v. YouTube and the cases on which it relies, however, may apply too
stringent a test. ‘Apparent’ does not mean ‘in fact illegal’, nor does it mean
‘conclusively exists’. The statute articulates two circumstances that hoist the
red flag: ‘actual knowledge’ of infringement and ‘facts and circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent’. Viacom and some of its prede-
cessors appear to conflate the two. Infringement may be ‘apparent’ yet subject
to verification (or contradiction). If the file name coincides with a work the
right owner has notified the user generated content site has not been licensed
for third party dissemination, and if the user has previously posted infringing
files, a ‘red flag’ standard that demands greater certainty from the outset risks
allowing the service provider to ‘turn a blind eye’ to infringements because
the provider could claim that the possibility that some files might not be
infringing means that infringement can never be ‘apparent’ as to any file.40
By the same token, section 512(m)’s dispensation of service providers from
‘affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity’, should not entitle
the service provider to passive-aggressive ignorance.
D. STATUTORY CONDITIONS FOR LIMITATION ON LIABILITY:
DIRECT FINANCIAL BENEFIT
Second, the service provider must not ‘receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider
39. 2010 Dist. LEXIS 62829 at *31–*32, quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
40. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1177 (C.D. Cal.
2002). In Cybernet, the district court stated that:
[t]he Court does not read section 512 to endorse business practices that would
encourage content providers to turn a blind eye to the source of massive copyright
infringement while continuing to knowingly profit, indirectly or not, from every
single one of these same sources until a court orders the provider to terminate each
individual account.
Id.
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has the right and ability to control such activity’.41 This standard adopts the
common law test for vicarious liability enunciated in copyright cases involv-
ing both traditional42 and digital infringement.43 As applied to culture-
for-me.com, the analysis would focus on how ‘direct’ the benefit of storing
user-posted infringing content must be to disqualify the website operator, and
on the level of control the website operator can exercise over the users who
post material to the site.
With respect to the nexus between the infringement and the benefit to the
website, if the website accepted advertising targeted to the infringing content,
the benefit would surely be ‘direct’. Moreover, if the website knew the content
was infringing, it would be obliged to remove the material even without
notification by the rightholder. Assume, however, that the relationship between
infringement and the benefit is more attenuated. For example, the website
accepts advertising; the rates charged are a function of the popularity of the
material alongside which the ads appear. Or, the website accepts advertising,
but the advertisements appear randomly; the rates are the same whatever the
content in connection with which the ads appear. The overall popularity of the
website will, however, influence the amount of money the website operator can
charge for ads. If it is true that free (unauthorized) copyrighted content is a
‘draw’,44 then making ad rates turn on the popularity of portions of the website
may foster too close a relationship between the infringements and the financial
benefit.
By contrast, in the second scenario the financial benefit may be too
attenuated;45 it might be necessary to show that the presence of free unauthor-
ized content makes the site as a whole more attractive than it would be without
41. § 512(c)(1)(B).
42. See, for example, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)
(liability of landlord of flea market at which vendors sold pirated sound recordings).
43. See, for example, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751, 766–767 (9th Cir. 2007)
(common law standards and § 512(c)(1)(B) standards are the same); A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022–1023 (9th Cir. 2001); Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet,
Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704 (D. Md. 2001), aff’d 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) (‘Basi-
cally, the DMCA provides no safe harbor for vicarious infringement because it codifies
both elements of vicarious liability.’). But some courts have applied one of the elements
of the common law standard for vicarious liability more narrowly in the context of
§ 512(c)(1)(B). See n. 55 below and accompanying text.
44. See, for example, Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (reversing the district court’s decision to
dismiss plaintiff’s vicarious copyright infringement claim where defendant flea market
operator received admissions fees, concession stand sales, and parking fees that were tied
to number of people at flea market); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d
993, 1002–1003 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (finding defendant received a benefit from increased
revenue at concession stands and on-site go-kart track); Arista Records, Inc. v.
MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660 (SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 29 Aug.
2002) (‘direct financial interest’ prong satisfied when infringing works acted as draw and
defendant received substantial amount of advertising tied to number of users).
45. Cf. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 262 (D.
Neb. 1982) (building company built building based on plaintiff’s architectural works
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that content. Put another way, the copyright owner may need to show that
the free unauthorized content is in fact ‘drawing’ users to the site.46 Such a
showing may imply a significant volume of infringing material,47 although
one court has declared that what matters ‘is a causal relationship between the
infringing activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of
how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a defendant’s overall profits’.48
Comparisons of ‘before and after’ visitor rates to websites formerly hosting
infringing material can supply some indication of the effect of that material on
a website’s popularity,49 but it may not be appropriate to generalize from one
website to another.50 The parties thus may be locked in a vicious circle: if
proving causation requires a ‘before and after’ showing with respect to the
defendant website, but the ‘after’ data cannot be acquired without ordering the
website to filter out infringing material, then either the copyright owner in
effect obtains the requested relief (compelling proactive steps on the part of
without permission, but lumber company and engineer employed by building company
who received fixed fees for constructing building held not vicariously liable).
46. See Costar Group, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 704–705 (stating that an indirect benefit that
infringements may provide to a website ‘does not fit within the plain language of the
statute’).
47. Compare Polygram Int’l Publ’g v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1333 (D. Mass.
1994) (stating that ‘[t]he crucial question for establishing the benefit prong of the test for
vicarious liability is not the exact amount of the benefit, but only whether the defendant
derived a benefit from the infringement that was substantial enough to be considered
significant’ and finding that the benefit was significant even though only 4 of 2,000 exhi-
bitors committed infringing acts), with Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ’g (USA), Inc., Nos
93 CIV. 3428(JFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 19 May 2004) (‘This Court
does not believe that alleged infringements by four of 134 exhibitors in any way affected
gate receipts at the Show. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that so much as a single attendee
came to the Show for sake of the music played by four out of 134 exhibitors.’).
48. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004).
49. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, ‘New Weapon in Web War over Piracy’, New York
Times, 19 Feb. 2007, C1 (explaining that when videosharing site ‘Guba’ implemented
filters to screen out infringing material, the site’s popularity ‘took a huge hit’).
50. Several services provide information regarding web sites’ traffic over a period of time.
See, for example, <www.comscore.com>, 26 May 2009; <http://siteanalytics.compete.
com>, 26 May 2009. But it is unclear whether such data can help courts draw reliable
conclusions about whether infringing works on a website acted as a draw. For example,
Compete has a measure – ‘people count’ – which purports to track how many people visit
a website each day. Many of the filtering service Audible Magic’s most notable clients did
not report a drop in traffic (according to this ranking) after announcing a plan to imple-
ment its filtering technologies, although other entrepreneurs did experience loss of traffic
to their sites. The lesson to draw from this information is unclear. Perhaps those websites
who did not lose audience did not depend on infringing materials in the first place. Or
perhaps the filtering technology has not been effective. Or, even if the technology works
as intended, perhaps the websites that saw an increase in traffic might have seen an even
greater increase had they not implemented the filtering technology. Attempts to draw
conclusions by comparing sites that do filter with those that do not are not likely to be very
probative because different levels of traffic may result from characteristics of the websites
that have nothing to do with filtering.
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the website) before it has made the required showing, or the relief is denied for
lack of a showing which cannot be made without ordering the website to take
the very action it resists.
E. STATUTORY CONDITIONS FOR LIMITATION ON LIABILITY: RIGHT
AND ABILITY TO CONTROL INFRINGING ACTIVITY
Even if the ‘direct financial benefit’ standard is met, the service provider will
not be disqualified from the safe harbour unless it also had the ‘right and
ability to control’ the infringing activity. Some courts appear to interpret the
control element differently depending on whether they are applying common
law principles of vicarious liability, or the section 512(c) criteria. In the
common law context, courts will rule that a defendant online service provider
has the ‘right and ability to control’ an infringing activity if it can block
attempts to use its online service for infringing activities.51 By contrast, some
courts have found that the ability to block access to infringing uses of a
website does not of itself mean that an online service provider has the ‘right
and ability to control’ for the purposes of section 512.52 The rationale for this
departure from the common law case law appears to derive from other aspects
of section 512. Section 512(c)(1)(C) conditions qualification for the safe har-
bour on expeditious removal of the infringing content once the service provider
is properly notified of its existence. To qualify for the statutory exemption, then,
the service provider must have the ability to block access, at least once the
material has been posted. But if the ability to block access also meets part of the
standard for disqualification from the exemption, then the statute would be
incoherent.53
Thus, in this view, ‘right and ability to control’ under section 512(c)(1)(B)
must mean something more than a subsequent ability to block access. Section
512(c)(1)(B) already sets out an additional element: receipt of a direct
financial benefit, so perhaps it is not necessary to devise what one might call
a ‘common law plus’ interpretation of ‘right and ability to control’. Alterna-
tively, ‘something more’ might mean an ability to intervene before the infringing
content is placed on the website.54 But this plus factor presents its own
51. See, for example, A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–1024 (9th Cir.
2001); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375–1376 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
52. See, for example, Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093–1094 (C.D. Cal.
2001); Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 704–705 (D. Md. 2001).
53. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093–1094; Costar Group, 164 F. Supp. 2d at
704 n.9.
54. See Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV064436 FMC AJWX, 2007 WL 1893635, at *3
(C.D. Cal. 20 Jun. 2007) (‘[T]he requirement [of ‘‘something more’’] presupposes some
antecedent ability to limit or filter copyrighted material.’ (citations omitted)); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1181–1182 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (‘Here
Cybernet prescreens sites, gives them extensive advice, prohibits the proliferation of
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anomalies: if the service provider must be more closely implicated in the user’s
activities in order to have the requisite control, then this condition on the safe
harbour would be redundant: the service provider would already be disqualified
on the section 512(c)(1)(A) ground that the service thereby acquires forbidden
knowledge of the user’s activities,55 or on the section 512(c) threshold ground
that the services it provides exceed the mere storage and communication of user-
posted content.
Moreover, it is not clear why recognizing post-hoc ability to block access
as satisfying the ‘right and ability to control’ prong would in fact make the
statute incoherent (or, at least, any more incoherent than it arguably already
is). It seems clear that a section 512(c) service provider cannot benefit from
the safe harbour if it sets up a system that disables it from exercising any
control over user postings: while absence of control would meet the section
512(c)(1)(B) criterion, the service provider would then fail to qualify under
section 512(c)(1)(C) because it would not be able to block access to the
infringing content. Thus, the inconsistencies of the statutory scheme are read-
ily apparent when one considers that the level of control requisite to qualifying
under (C) might also cause disqualification under (B), and that the inability
to block access qualifies the service provide under (B), but disqualifies it
under (C).
III. CONCLUSION
It appears, despite the complexities of section 512, that the statutory prere-
quisites for application of the safe harbour should exclude a website that is not
economically viable without its users’ infringements, or which significantly
benefits from infringement. Most importantly, the statutory constraints on
qualifying for the section 512 safe harbour would preclude a UGC site
from correlating advertising to infringing material, thus preventing the web-
site operator from realizing the full value of the posted material. Under section
512, the operator must charge the same advertising rates for the popular
professionally-produced content that its users post (in theory without the
website’s knowledge or invitation) as for genuinely user-created content.
But one might expect that advertisers would pay more to run their ads
alongside a successful television show than abutting my home video of my
identical sites, and in the variety of ways mentioned earlier exhibits precisely this slightly
difficult to define ‘‘something more’’.’).
55. The Viacom court appears to have committed this solecism: in holding that ‘The ‘‘right
and ability to control’’ the activity requires knowledge of it, which must be item-specific.’
2010 US Dist. LEXIS 62829 at *41, the court conflated the s. 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) ‘red flag’
criteria with the s. 512(c)(1)(B) financial benefit criteria. Because the safe harbor claimant
must satisfy both standards, the standards should be interpreted to have independent
meaning.
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hamster’s summer vacation. Once the site seeks to monetize the actual value
of the posted material, however, it leaves the shelter of section 512. Thus,
notwithstanding the outcome of judicial analysis of section 512 in the
Viacom v. YouTube and other cases, one may anticipate that business impera-
tives will in the long run counsel an accord between copyright owners and
UGC sites.56
56. See, for example, Alan N. Braverman & Terri Southwick, ‘The User-Generated Content
Principles: The Motivation, Process, Results and Lessons Learned’, Columbia Journal of
Law& Arts 32 (2009): 471 (describing multi-party development of ‘‘Copyright Principles
for UGC Services’’’); Claire Cain Miller, ‘YouTube Ads Turn Videos Into Revenue’,
New York Times (Sept. 2, 2010), <www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/technology/03youtube.
html?_r=1&scp=9&sq=youtube%20friday%20September%203&st=cse> (describing licen-
sing of user-posted third-party copyrighted content for revenue-sharing advertisements).
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